





**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Wednesday  
12 May 1982***

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⑧ ZIMBABWE: Ties With Communist Countries

*Zimbabwe is gradually improving its relations with Communist countries, but Prime Minister Mugabe continues to rebuff most requests from the USSR for closer cooperation.*

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Zimbabwe has established closer ties with some of the USSR's allies. East Germany's Foreign Minister visited Zimbabwe last week to discuss closer bilateral relations

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Zimbabwe's relations are closest with North Korea, China, Romania, and Yugoslavia, all of which supported Mugabe during the civil war.

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*Comment:* Mugabe values close ties with the West, particularly in economic matters, but he believes that he must establish good relations with some Communist countries to maintain his nonaligned credentials. He probably will continue to avoid close cooperation with the USSR, however, because of his suspicion that Moscow may still be providing some support to Zimbabwe African People's Union leader Joshua Nkomo. To placate the Soviets, he may open an embassy in Moscow this year; the Soviets opened their Embassy in Zimbabwe in June 1981.

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

(14)

## IRAN-IRAQ: Implications of Iraqi Defeats

*Iraq's latest military defeats have increased the likelihood of a move against President Saddam Hussein. Dissent is more visible in the Army, and antigovernment demonstrations are spreading in Iraqi Kurdistan.*

During the past two months, Iraq's hold on Iran's Khuzestan Province has evaporated, and war casualties continue to mount. Al Basrah, Iraq's second-largest city, is now vulnerable to Iranian shelling and perhaps ground assault.

Saddam has to find a way to end the war or at least reduce substantially the level of fighting. With the Iranians unwilling to negotiate, he may attempt a unilateral withdrawal, gambling that the Iranians will not invade Iraq, or, if they do, that Egypt and other Arab states will intervene. If the war can be reduced to a border conflict, Saddam would then be free to move against domestic opponents.

Bleak Military Outlook

Baghdad faces the choice of either withdrawing from Iran or being pushed out. Since last September, its forces have suffered a series of major defeats that have largely destroyed their hold on Khuzestan. Iraqi forces in Khorramshahr, the largest Iranian city in Iraqi hands, are in danger of being cut off.

Even more worrisome for Baghdad are the growing signs of discontent among the Army's largely Shia enlisted ranks.

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A unilateral Iraqi withdrawal from other occupied territory would concede Iran terrain near Qasr-e Shirin, which dominates a main invasion route toward Baghdad. Al Basrah would be even more vulnerable to Iranian attack. Several smaller cities near the central portion of the border also would become vulnerable to Iranian artillery.

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Al Basrah is likely to be Iran's main target if Tehran does decide to invade. Al Basrah is only about 20 kilometers from the border, and Iraqi units in the south have been demoralized by the recent defeats. Iraqi units in the north, on the other hand, are intact and probably can contain any thrust toward Baghdad.

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#### Economic Pressures

Serious economic pressures on Iraq will continue whether or not Iranian troops stop at the border. Saddam almost certainly will be forced to adopt additional economic austerity measures. Iraq is faced with the prospect of an \$8 billion foreign exchange gap this year, and continued erosion of the standard of living will further weaken the President's popularity.

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Iraq's only remaining source of oil income is the 700,000 barrels per day it exports through the pipeline across Turkey. Baghdad plans to increase its capacity by two-thirds, but this will take at least four months and the line is vulnerable to sabotage.

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### Domestic and Foreign Reactions

Except for the turmoil in Kurdistan, there is no indication of major unrest in Iraq, but the Iraqi public reportedly is stunned by the recent withdrawals. Support for "Saddam's war" will erode as the scope of the Iraqi setback becomes apparent in Baghdad. [REDACTED]

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Opposition groups apparently have begun to coordinate their efforts more closely, hoping a growing wave of unrest will unseat Saddam. All major Kurdish factions, as well as the Iraqi Communist Party and several smaller groups, reportedly have begun working together. The Shia-dominated Dawa Party also has begun to work with the Kurds. [REDACTED]

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Iraq's moderate Arab supporters are alarmed by the prospect of an Iraqi military collapse, which they fear will lead to Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf. Their options, however, are limited. [REDACTED]

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Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states in the Persian Gulf region probably will continue to supply Iraq financial and military aid but almost certainly will not provide troops. They are likely to continue mediation efforts and reextend offers of reparations to Iran as an inducement to negotiate. [REDACTED]

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